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ix states have abolished the death 
penalty in the past six years—Illinois, 
New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, 
Maryland, and New Mexico. We 
haven’t seen mass moves like that since 
the 1960s. What gives? 
Part of the answer is that those states weren’t execut-
ing anyway. More people in those states were dying on 
death row waiting to be executed than were actually 
being executed, and the death penalty is breathtakingly 
expensive to maintain (a point to which I’ll return in a 
moment). 
So why weren’t the states executing? We tend to hear 
about innocence claims, trench warfare litigation, offi-
cial moratoriums, study commissions, and the like. But 
there’s another phenomenon that has quietly wreaked 
havoc in the administration of the death penalty in the 
United States: the dearth of death penalty drugs. 
Here’s the backstory. 
Until recently, lethal injection was carried out by 
a three-drug concoction that included a drug called 
sodium thiopental, which, as it turns out, had just one 
domestic producer—a company called Hospira. But 
Hospira didn’t want its product used for executions. It 
manufactures drugs to “improve or save lives,” not to 
end them, so it asked states not to use its product for 
that purpose. But the states didn’t honor its request. So 
Hospira concluded that the best way to prevent what it 
termed the “misuse” of its drug in executions was to stop 
making it altogether. And that’s what Hospira did.
 That led to all sorts of problems as death penalty 
states started looking abroad for alternative suppliers of 
the drug. Pharmaceuticals in Germany make sodium 
thiopental, but they refused to sell it for use in lethal 
injections. A Swiss pharmaceutical company makes 
sodium thiopental, but it said no, too—and then asked 
Nebraska for its “wrongfully diverted” supply back. 
Great Britain is also a producer of sodium thiopental, 
but it banned the export of lethal injection drugs to 
the United States and urged the European Union to do 
the same, which it did. Under the EU’s new rule, phar-
maceutical manufacturers may not export drugs used 
for executions in the United States unless they have a 
special permit showing that the export is not for execu-
tions. Meanwhile, a prison warden back in the United 
States told the press, “I am beginning to think drug 
companies and suppliers are not real happy to have to 
supply us for this use.” 
The result of all this is that nowadays about the 
only way for death penalty states to get sodium thiopen-
tal for executions is to get it on the international black 
market. India may be involved; an operation running 
out of a “gritty London neighborhood” may be, too. 
And because states are getting sodium thiopental on 
the black market, there are legitimate questions about 
whether the shipments that make it to the United States 
meet minimum purity standards—not to mention the 
fact that most states’ lethal injection statutes assume that 
the drugs come from some approved, or appropriate, or 
at least not illegal, source.
Because states are importing the drug, often illegal-
ly, the Food and Drug Administration has also become 
involved. It tried not to be. The FDA first took the 
position that death penalty drugs weren’t its problem. 
According to the FDA, it was charged with regulating 
drugs “to protect public health” and, well, drugs to kill 
people are definitely not for public health, so the whole 
enterprise was outside the ambit of its authority.
But a federal judge disagreed, finding that the FDA 
had “arbitrarily and capriciously” abused its discretion 
in refusing to review death penalty drug imports. So 
now the FDA is asking states to turn over their stocks of 
sodium thiopental for its review and approval. Thus far, 
South Dakota has refused. California too.
The United States Drug Enforcement Agency has 
had better luck. Citing “questions about how the drug 
was imported,” the DEA seized Georgia’s entire supply 
of sodium thiopental in the spring of 2011, effec-
tively preventing executions in the state. It then seized 
Kentucky and Tennessee’s supplies too, exacerbating 
shortages already plaguing states itching to execute but 
without the drugs to do so.
That’s when the whole thing started to unravel. As 
it turns out, Kentucky had reached out to more than two 
dozen states to obtain sodium thiopental before ultimately 
buying it from Georgia. Tennessee had shared its supply 
with Georgia and Arkansas, and Arkansas had shared its 
supply with Oklahoma, Mississippi, and Tennessee. 
And then there is California, which reportedly 
“scoured the nation” for sodium thiopental before 
finally getting it from Arizona. In brokering the deal, 
a California prison official actually sent an email to 
his Arizona counterpart thanking him and adding, 
completely oblivious to the irony, “You guys in AZ 
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So what can states determined to use the death 
penalty do? The chief alternative to sodium thiopental is 
a drug called pentobarbital, and states have increasingly 
turned to this drug for its executions instead. But here, 
too, there is a hitch. 
The sole supplier of pentobarbital in the United 
States is a Danish company called Lundbeck, and 
Lundbeck is likewise strongly opposed to the use of its 
drug in lethal injections, claiming it is “against every-
thing we’re in business to do.” The drug is intended 
to treat epilepsy and euthanize animals, Lundbeck 
maintains, and is not safe for use in untested ways, 
like human executions. Lundbeck has asked states not 
to use its drug in lethal injections, to no avail. The 
company has now turned to end-user clauses to prevent 
such use. 
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What does all this mean for death penalty states? 
One thing it means is that a number of states simply aren’t 
executing—not because they don’t want to, but because 
they can’t. It also means that, once again, states are on the 
hunt for a new paralytic to use in lethal injections. 
Missouri recently changed its lethal injection pro-
tocol to include a drug called propofol, the drug that 
caused Michael Jackson’s death. The state will likely have 
to try again, however, since the second of the only two 
domestic suppliers of propofol has now said it will not 
accept orders of the drug from U.S. corrections depart-
ments. Virginia has turned to a drug called rocuronium 
bromide, which 42 states have banned as a paralytic for 
euthanizing animals because it may cause excruciating 
pain. Texas, too, has switched its drug protocol due to 
supply shortages, but it then adopted a non-disclosure 
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policy for all lethal injection drug information, so we 
don’t really know what drugs it’s using.
Not only is the search for death penalty drugs gum-
ming up the execution process, but it is also requiring 
states to rewrite their statutes, which is causing problems 
of its own. Arkansas, for example, amended its lethal 
injection statute to allow the department of corrections 
to choose “one or more chemicals” for use in lethal 
injection, but its Supreme Court struck down the law, 
holding that such “unfettered discretion” in the executive 
branch did not pass constitutional muster. 
And then there is California, which cannot seem to 
get an execution to save its life. Having just revised its 
three-drug protocol to remedy constitutional deficien-
cies in its previous lethal injection procedure, California’s 
Supreme Court has now declared that its protocol 
is again deficient, in part because it failed to con-
sider a one-drug option. So back to the drawing board 
California goes. 
That brings me back around to cost. As one might 
imagine, the dearth of death penalty drugs has had a 
dramatic effect on the cost of lethal injections. In 2012, 
states paid 15 times more for death penalty drugs than 
they paid in 2011, and in 2011, they paid 10 times more 
than they had paid in years past. 
But more importantly, the dearth of death penalty 
drugs has thrown a wrench into the states’ ability to carry 
out the death penalty at all, which has fed into an even 
larger death penalty debate about cost. 
In each of the states that have abolished capital pun-
ishment over the past several years, the cost of the death 
penalty—or more precisely, what the state was getting 
for that cost—played a critical role in the decision.
Illinois, for example, estimated that it spent some 
$100 million on the death penalty in the 10 years prior 
to its abolition, and it had executed no one during that 
time. New York estimated that it spent $170 million on 
the death penalty since reinstating it in 1995, while New 
Jersey’s estimated cost since reinstatement in 1982 was $253 
million—and neither of those states had a single execution 
to show for it. New Mexico’s governor cited economic con-
siderations in signing his state’s abolition bill as well.
In Connecticut, cost does not appear to have been 
a driving factor in abolition, but the “unworkability” 
of the death penalty was. The state executed only one 
person in the last 50 years, and he had volunteered. 
In Maryland, the latest state to abolish the death 
penalty, the governor supported abolition in part because 
the death penalty cost the state three times more than a 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole—and 
there wasn’t much difference in result.
Californians narrowly voted to keep the death penalty 
this past fall—a referendum proposing to abandon capital 
punishment was defeated 53 to 47 percent—and cost was 
a dominant theme in that debate. With the largest death 
row in the country, California’s death penalty costs are 
astronomically high. A recent study estimated that the state 
spends around $137 million a year on its death penalty 
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(although other sources have put that figure higher) and 
that it would cost California around $11.5 million a year 
to maintain a penal system with a maximum punishment 
of life without the possibility of parole instead. 
Thus far, California has spent around $4 billion on 
its death penalty since the 1970s and has only 13 execu-
tions to show for it—an average cost of more than $300 
million per execution. That’s a lot of health care. A lot 
of education. A lot more police officers on the streets. 
The fact is that states are abolishing the death 
penalty because they don’t get much bang for the buck. 
Only one in 500 murders results in a death sentence, and 
those that do rarely lead to an execution. In California 
and many other death penalty states, more people die 
on death row of natural causes than by the executioner’s 
hand. In practice, the death penalty tends to be life with-
out parole—we’re just paying lots more for it.
In these austere times, the fact that the death 
penalty is so expensive to maintain, and so hard to 
carry out, is changing the script of the death penalty 
debate. Demurring on the death penalty is no longer 
about being “soft on crime.” It is about being “smart on 
crime.” It makes no sense to have a death penalty that 
costs millions to maintain but is almost never used. 
And that, in turn, has created the political room to 
abandon death. Voting against the death penalty used to 
be political suicide. Now it is couched in terms of fiscal 
responsibility. Because it saves the taxpayers money, it is 
the right thing to do. 
Money is the new morality.
I, for one, view this development with mixed emo-
tions. There are now more than 140 people who have 
been exonerated while on death row—more than 140 
people who the state claimed the right to execute and 
whose innocence was later proven. By and large, that 
hasn’t moved us.
Study after study has shown that the death penalty 
today is as arbitrary and capricious—and, let’s face it, 
racially discriminatory—as it was in 1972, when the 
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia temporarily abol-
ished it. Death today turns more on the victim’s race, the 
quality of appointed counsel, and random factors like 
the county where the crime was committed, than it turns 
on the severity of the crime or the dangerousness of the 
criminal. But none of those arguments has moved us. 
In the end, I suspect abolitionists will take a money 
argument that works over a moral argument that doesn’t. 
What most people don’t know is the backstory of how 
Big Pharma is helping them do it. n
Corinna Barrett Lain is professor of law and associate dean 
of faculty development. This article derives from “On the 
Virtues of Thinking Small,” which appeared in the Winter 
2013 issue of  University of Miami Law Review.
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